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1. Introduction
Abstract
Vastly increased research and a sounder technique in history in the nineteenth century had two influences on
the social sciences. When an enthusiasm for the records of history was combined with the evolutionary
perspective, it often resulted in the search for and the imposition of patterns of development on history in
general or on the history of particular subject matters such as economics, politics, morals, or religion. Social
scientists looked to history for explanations, in the hope of finding inevitable laws, stages of development, or
the forces that moved human society. As historians worked out a critical method for their subject matter
which more accurately and justly portrayed the complex record of past events, the social scientists were
stimulated to adopt the same approach to their own subject matters. They turned to composing histories
instead of creating sciences. To many, economics became the history of economic institutions; political
science, the history of political institutions; anthropology, the history of civilizations, societies, and cultures.
Psychology was relatively immune to this influence and turned toward an experimental method. [excerpt]
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XXI. MEANING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
lo Introduction 
In the chapter on the eighteenth century Enlightenment, we 
saw the beginning of the contemporary social sciences of psy­
chology, economics, and political science. The method of these 
sciences was the deduction of laws from axioms or propositions 
mgde from observations, however limited, of human experience; 
the goal was a deductive, universal, necessary system of truth. 
Succeeding chapters showed the application of the conclusions 
reached in these sciences to economic and political affairs. 
Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, the method, 
goal, and conclusions of the eighteenth century science of man 
were the predominant ideas animating the social sciences and 
the accepted economic, political, and moral doctrines. 
In Chapter XV we saw the impact of biology and Darwin's 
idea of evolution upon men's minds and upon the new social 
sciences of anthropology and sociology. Biology and evolution 
gave a new orientation to the social sciences and a set of new 
conceptions and premises that have continued to influence them 
to the present day. First, the universe, man, and society 
were conceived as changing and growing processes and not as 
static and fixed constructions. Time and change were distinc­
tive characteristics of all subject matters. Investigation of 
the scientific processes of change in man and his institutions 
became a part of every science. Second, biology, psychology 
and anthropology were placed in a prominent position rather 
than physics and mathematics. Man was an organism acting in 
the context of the physical and social environment. The rela­
tion between man and his environment was a complex system of 
action and reaction. Third, the naturalistic and humanistic 
attitudes were reinforced. Man, more than ever before, was 
placed directly in nature as one of its products and species, 
subject to all natural laws, and to be studied by the natural 
sciences. Some stressed the part that man played in directing 
and controlling evolutionary change. For them, the selection 
of goals and values became of the utmost importance. Fourth, 
knowledge was looked at from a new perspective. It was a 
specific form of biological adaptation; man's keenest instru­
ment for the successful maintenance of life. Knowledge, ideas, 
science were seen as subject to change and development. The 
aspects of tentativity and relativity received increased attention. 
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There were, however, short-range influences of evolution 
and biology that produced some striking theories which had 
their heyday in the nineteenth century. Chapter XV described 
in some detail the theory of social Darwinism as expressed by 
Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner. The social scien­
tists borrowed biology's categories of the struggle for exist­
ence, natural selection and the survival of the fittest, and 
interpreted the activities of races, groups, and institutions 
through them, ignoring the possibility of differences between 
social and organic evolution and the possibility of other 
categories. The conception of social organism was borrowed 
from biology and made the bagiis of many economic, political, 
and social theories. Society and the state were conceived as 
genuine living organisms forming a unity of functioning cells. 
"The attempts to elaborate on this analogy forced the theorist 
into certain patterns of thought, to the neglect of the study 
of society, the state, and the economy as it actually existed 
and functioned. Theories of the evolutionary development of 
civilizations and institutions were created. Sociologists and 
anthropologists especially worked out schemes showing the 
stages of social and cultural development, and using fragmen­
tary evidence of customs and ideas taken from different times, 
places, and cultures, Herbert Spencer's system of the evolu­
tion of civilization is an illustration of this type of ap­
proach. The theories of social Darwinism, social organism, and • 
evolutionary development were still in the spirit of the eight­
eenth century ideal of science as a universal, necessary system 
of truth and the deductive method. 
Vastly increased research and a sounder technique in his­
tory in the nineteenth century had two influences on the social 
sciences. When an enthusiasm for the records of history was 
combined with the evolutionary perspective, it often resulted 
in the search for and the imposition of patterns of development 
on history in general or on the history of particular subject 
matters such as economics, politics, morals, or religion. So­
cial scientists looked to history for explanations, in the hope 
of finding inevitable laws, stages of development, or the 
forces that moved human society. As historians worked out a 
critical method for their subject matter which more accurately 
and justly portrayed the complex record of past events, the 
social scientists were stimulated to adopt the same approach to 
their own subject matters. They turned to composing histories 
instead of creating sciences. To many, economics became the 
history of economic institutions; political science, the history 
of political institutions; anthropology, the history of civil­
izations, societies, and cultures. Psychology was relatively 
immune to this influence and turned toward an experimental 
method. 
The growth of psychology as an experimental science toward 
the end of the nineteenth century seemed to provide a new orien­
tation for the social sciences. Since the evolutionary and his- • 
torical approaches had proven inadequate for the social sciences 
as sciences, and since the conception of human nature was for 
XXI p, 3 
them a fundamental one, psychology was looked to for aid. It 
was hoped that a sound psychology could be made the basis for 
theory and laws in economics, political science, anthropology, 
and sociology. However, at first, the social sciences either 
returned to the psychology of the Enlightenment, as in the case 
of economics, or they selected certain very hypothetical con­
clusions of the newer psychology and proceeded to build systems 
around them. In sociology, for example, the factors of sym­
pathy and imitation were isolated and made key explanatory prin­
ciples by which all social phenomena could be explained. When 
the irrational aspect of human behavior received attention, 
sociologists based th6ir systems upon particular instincts such 
as sex or "the herd," 6r upon a number of instincts which were 
used to explain the actions of men. 
As psychology matured as an experimental science, the in­
stinct theory was rejected for more complex theories of the 
motivation of behavior. Each of the social sciences has had to 
reconstruct its theories and hypotheses in the light of the re­
vised concept of man offered by such theories. They have had 
to recognize that human beings are creatures of impulse, pas­
sion, emotional preference, and habit, as well as reason; that 
each man is an individual with different hereditary capacities 
and attitudes, and a personality which is a unique synthesis; 
and that men are largely the product of their society and cul­
ture. The influence of anthropology, sociology, and history in 
directing attention to the last factor illustrates the growing 
impact of the social sciences upon each other. 
By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth the social sciences had accumulated impressive 
collections of factual information and devised innumerable con­
cepts, hypotheses, and theories, but had discovered few, if any, 
verified laws. This situation generated a critical and discrim­
inating attitude among social scientists which directed their 
efforts to two tasks; the gathering of more facts and the in­
vestigation of methods of analysis. The first task usually took 
the form of detailed arid specific ^inquiries into small areas of 
research, in the hope that accuracy and completeness could be 
attained, and that caii|al laws or correlations might be more 
easily found. The second task has resulted in creating a new 
subject, methodology, #ithin each of the social sciences. Cer­
tain general trends can be discerned in this subject. No one 
science, such as physics or biology, is singled out as a model; 
instead different areas of inquiry are believed to require dif­
fering intellectual instruments. Hypotheses and theories are 
held extremely tentatively and suggested only if there is the 
possLboLity of testing them by the available data. There is an 
emphasis on experimental procedure, both narrowly conceived, as 
in the use of control groups, and more broadly in the sense of 
historical similarities, A constant attempt is made to present 
data in quantitative form and to use statistics to find pos­
sible correlations between quantitatively stated variables. 
Finally, there is a return to historical, descriptive studies 
of human behavior in all fields. These studies modestly hope 
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to acquaint men with the variables that need to be known and 
examined, rather than to yield laws of the relationships of 
variables. 
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century developments 
in physics, mathematics, and philosophy have added to the crit­
ical and sophisticated attitude of the social scientists. Each 
of these subjects has emphasized the creative role of the 
thinker in constructing concepts and theories, and the effect 
of the observer upon what is being observed. Mathematicians 
and logicians have devised a variety of deductive systems. 
Philosophers, working in the fields of semantics, logic, and 
the philosophy of science, have made men aware of the complex 
problems inherent in the process of inquiry into every subject 
matter. The philosophical movements known as pragmatism, log­
ical empiricism, and analysis have vividly demonstrated that 
men continue to give different answers to the question, "What 
is scientific knowledge?" 
The social sciences have been confronted with a particular 
form of the above question. Are they to be classed as sciences 
or studies? The crux of this question seems to be whether the 
physical sciences are to be taken as the model of science. If 
they are, then such procedures as exact quantitative measure­
ment , laboratory experiments, and the formulation of laws which 
yield prediction are necessary characteristics of science. 
Judged by these criteria, psychology is the only subject which 
could be classed even partially as a science. However, if we 
mean by science the use of careful methods of observation and 
classification, the use of statistics, the construction of hy­
potheses and theories to organize and direct research, and the 
ability to make predictions characterized by probability, then 
we would class them as sciences. 
This question appears somewhat academic when we become ac­
quainted with the knowledge that does exist in the social sci­
ences, and with their concern for methods of inquiry. Man has 
expanded his knowledge of himself and his institutions, both in 
amount and in direction. There is a degree of interrelation of 
knowledge of subject matters that has not previously existed, 
and there is a degree of application of the knowledge gained 
that affects every aspect of our lives. Representatives of each 
of the social sciences are employed in all branches of govern­
ment, industry, business, foundations, and educational institu­
tions. A new question has occurred in our day: If the social 
sciences do allow us to control the direction of change, what 
goals are to be selected and who selects them? In other words, 
values or ethics, which had been divorced from the social sci­
ences , now appear crucial. 
This introduction has concentrated on the general character­
istics and problems of the social sciences. The following sec­
tions on economics, sociology, and psychology offer specific in­
formation on these three subjects. Political science and anthro­
pology have been omitted only for reasons of time and space. 
